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COMMENT
Fact Determination in Rule 23
Class Actions
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
Considerable complication and difficulty has been experienced in
Rule 23 litigation because of uncertainty about the authority of the
court to make fact determinations, particularly in connection with the
issue of class certification. The assumption has been that the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover' prop-
erly define and restrict the authority of a judge in equity litigation to
determine issues of fact.2 I suggest that this position should be reex-
amined and modified.
In Rule 23 litigation there can be fact issues at various stages of a
case. There are the ultimate substantive issues of injury, damage, and
liability, as in any other type of litigation. But there are also prelimi-
nary issues peculiar to class suits, such as qualification under Rule
23(a),3 class definition,4 possibility of subclasses,5 adequacy of repre-
* Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, Hastings College of the Law, University of
California.
1 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
2 See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving
Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 183, 207 (2000) (stating that the
Court in Beacon Theatres "preserved and even expanded the jury's fact-finding function" and
"determined that procedural changes resulting from the merger of law and equity reduced the
need for issues to be tried in equity").
3 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
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sentation,6 and intervention by third parties.7 Now that discovery has
been recognized as appropriate in exploring such issues,8 there are
often issues concerning discovery itself. Another question is whether
the trial judge may properly be involved in settlement discussions.9
The relevance of Beacon Theatres to these issues is evident. The
broad dictum in Beacon Theatres is well-known:
[T]he justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it
obtains jurisdiction, and refusing to dismiss a case, merely
because subsequently a legal remedy becomes available,
must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal joinder provi-
sions of the Federal Rules which allow legal and equitable
causes to be brought and resolved in one civil action....
... [T]he trial court will necessarily have to use its dis-
cretion in deciding whether the legal or equitable cause
should be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a constitu-
tional one, however, while no similar requirement protects
trials by the court, that discretion is very narrowly limited
and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury
trial.'0
This proposition became a holding in Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood," which involved juxtaposition of the equitable remedy of ac-
counting and the legal remedy of damages.' 2
However, Beacon Theatres was a gross distortion of the historical
record and of the effect of the Federal Rules. Justice Stewart, along
with Justices Harlan and Whittaker, said so in dissent at the time, and
subsequent scholarship has been to the same effect.13 It may be noted
that several state courts have rejected the thesis in Beacon Theatres
and accordingly have retained the historic province of equity in their
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3).
8 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes to 2003 amendment ("[I]t is appropri-
ate to conduct controlled discovery into the 'merits,' limited to those aspects relevant to making
the certification decision."); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011)
(allowing lower courts to consider the merits of a suit in precertification discovery).
9 See generally Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?-The Need for a Clearer
Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45 (1994).
10 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1959) (footnote omitted).
11 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
12 Id. at 471-73.
13 Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 517-19 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JOHN LEUBSDORF & DEBRA LYN BASSETT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 544-48 (6th ed. 2011);
John C. McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10-15 (1967).
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own procedural systems, notwithstanding that those systems were as
fully "merged" as in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 14
The Supreme Court subsequent to Beacon Theatres took quite a
different tack in Ross v. Bernhard.15 That decision addressed a deriva-
tive action brought by corporate shareholders for the benefit of the
corporation.16 The shareholders' derivative action is historically
within equity jurisdiction,' 7 and the question was whether the right to
jury trial nevertheless applied to fact issues in the case.18 The district
court had held that the right to jury trial "was to be judged as if the
corporation were itself the plaintiff. Only the shareholder's initial
claim to speak for the corporation had to be tried to the judge."l 9 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the whole case was for the
judge.20
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court, and in doing so
carefully distinguished two phases of the derivative suit:
[O]ne precondition for the [stockholders'] suit was a valid
claim on which the corporation could have sued; another was
that the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suita-
ble demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.
Thus the dual nature of the stockholder's action: first, the
plaintiff's right to sue on behalf of the corporation and, sec-
ond, the merits of the corporation's claim itself.2'
The class suit, like the shareholder's derivative suit, also derives
from historic equity.22 The classic class action cases in the federal
courts are of course Smith v. Swormstedt23 and Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble.24
By reasoning parallel to that in Ross v. Bernhard, the class suit
has a dual nature: first, whether the suit may be maintained as a repre-
sentative action-in this context the representative acts on behalf of
members of the class, whereas in the derivative suit it is the share-
holder who acts on behalf of the corporate entity-and second, the
14 See, e.g., Weltzin v. Nail, 618 N.W.2d 293, 297, 300 (Iowa 2000) (citing other state
decisions).
15 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
16 Id. at 531-32.
17 Id. at 534.
18 See id. at 537-38.
19 Id. at 532.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 534-35 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 538-39.
22 See 1 THOMAS ATKINs STREET, FEDERAL Eourry PRACTICE, ch. XII (1909).
23 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
24 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
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trial of the class members' claims against the defendant. 25 In particu-
lar, it would be appropriate to hold individual trials to establish the
proper estimate of damages for class members as a basis for class-wide
settlement.26 Under the analysis in Ross v. Bernhard, these trials
would be before a jury.27
Again, by reasoning parallel to that in Ross v. Bernhard, it would
be appropriate for issues of fact in the first phase of a class suit to be
decided by the judge.28 Those determinations would have the same
force and effect as similar preliminary determinations made in con-
nection with a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction:
they would be preclusive in the subsequent stages except as reconsid-
ered by the judge. 29 As with the preliminary determinations in Ross,
there would be no concern that the judge was inappropriately deter-
mining issues that might later come before a jury in the second
phase.30 So limited, preliminary determinations in the first phase of a
class suit would not run afoul of parties' jury trial rights as expounded
upon in Beacon Theatres.
25 See Ross, 396 U.S. at 534-35.
26 Cf id. at 534.
27 Cf id. at 542.
28 Cf id. at 538.
29 See, e.g., FED. R. Cwv. P. 23; FED. R. Cwv. P. 65.
30 Cf Ross, 396 U.S. at 538.
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